When Americans think about how the United States engages the world, we instinctively reach for maps. Our government bureaucracies are organized this way: regional bureaus at the State Department, unified commands at the Department of Defense, and component commands within the Navy. We have neatly drawn boundaries that shape policy debates, strategy, and force development decisions.1
But the world does not organize itself along U.S. bureaucratic seams. Commerce, data, and adversaries cut across regions. Revising the Unified Command Plan (the classified document that assigns missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas to U.S. combatant commands), empowering commands as global integrators, or giving commands global authorities does not change reality. Warships, commercial shipping, and fishing fleets operate across oceans. Yet, warships face different threats across different regions and are assigned different missions. The modern Caribbean is relatively benign with a focus on targeting small fast craft, the Indian Ocean can be non-permissive with a focus on major combat operations, and the Mediterranean is close to allies with ships focused on high-end ballistic missile defense and land attack.
For part of the twentieth century, the United States solved this problem by building what Franklin Roosevelt in 1940 called a “two-ocean Navy,” providing enough ships to operate within the Atlantic and the Pacific.2 Beginning in the 1930s and culminating in 1940, Congress passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act, which authorized an unprecedented expansion of shipyards that enabled the Navy to innovate and scale up to equip a fleet for each ocean.3 While it was a historically large naval expansion, it also provides a contemporary lens to inform fleet design.
Given the scope of national security today, the U.S. cannot afford to build enough warships, the industrial base could not build said warships even if resources were available, and a globe-oriented fleet would be inadequate. Multi-purpose ships ready to operate everywhere leads to overmatch when destroyers interdict dhows in the Gulf of Aden or drug boats in the Caribbean and undermatch when contemplating the defense of Taiwan. Simply, today’s approach to fleet design does not work. A globally dispersed Navy deprives the Pacific Ocean region of needed forces while increasing strain on ships and crews, reducing service life, and undermining needed investment in the Pacific theater that defines future high-end naval warfare.
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